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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes an approach for validation of 
numerical inputs based on graphical user interfaces 
(GUI) that are modeled and specified by event se-
quence graphs (ESG). For considering complex struc-
tures of input data, ESGs are augmented by decision 
tables and patterns of design by contract (DbC). The 
approach is evaluated by experiments on boundary 
overflows, which occur when input values violate the 
range of specified values. Furthermore, a tool is pre-
sented that implements our approach enabling a semi-
automatically detection of boundary overflow errors 
and suggesting correction steps based on DbC. 
Keywords: Input Validation, Event Sequence 
Graphs, Decision Tables, Design by Contract, Bound-
ary Overflow, Security Testing 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Input validation testing chooses test data that at-
tempt to show the presence or absence of specific faults 
pertaining to input tolerance [16]. This paper focuses 
on numerical input validation testing of graphical user 
interfaces (GUI). Our approach for input validation 
suggests to specify user interface requirements and to 
convert this specification into a model from which 
valid and invalid test cases can be generated [3]. For 
specification of user-system interactions we choose an 
event-based formal model, where the inputs and events 
are merged and assigned to the vertices of an event 
transition diagram, called event sequence graph (ESG); 
arcs visualize the sequence relation of the events. An 
ESG is a simple albeit powerful formalism for captur-
ing the behavior of interactive systems. However, mod-
eling complex boundary restrictions on input data as 
well as dependencies among them inflates the ESG 
model of a system under consideration (SUC). To 
overcome this problem, we refine the nodes of the un-
derlying ESG by decision tables, which visualize Boo-
lean algebraic constraints on input data [4]. Decision 
table augmented ESG is supplemented with design by 
contract (DbC) patterns so that decision table rules for 
numerical input validation are refined to pre-condition 
rules. Based on these concepts, test data are generated. 
Equivalence class partitioning and boundary value ap-
proaches support the test case generation process [1,2]. 
This paper is an extension of our preliminary work 
[26], where we introduced algorithms for detection and 
correction of boundary overflow vulnerabilities through 
static analysis. The novelty of the present paper stems 
from following: 
(i) Theoretical background is extended by incorpo-
rating ESGs. 
(ii) Concept of DbC patterns have also been for-
malized. Especially pre-condition pattern of DbC plays 
an important role in refining decision tables for input 
validation. The formalism we introduce in Section 3.3 
enables to considerably improve test case generation 
algorithm. 
(iii) The tool we introduced in our preliminary work 
is improved. Our tool now adds an exception handling 
mechanism, which we built on DbC concept, instead of 
a simple if statement wherever necessary.  
(iv) For validation of the approach we tested three 
open source port scanners, developed in C++, in a local 
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area network (LAN). The resulting network packets are 
captured using a network utility.  
(v) We enriched the paper by reporting on our ex-
periences we gained by experiments in (iv). 
Next section summarizes related work before Sec-
tion 3 outlines the theoretical background of the ap-
proach. The core of the paper, Section 4, presents our 
test by DbC supplemented ESG approach. Sections 5 
and 6 include technical details of the approach and case 
studies on different port scanners. Section 7 concludes 
the paper and outlines future work planned. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Our approach combines input validation with static 
analysis for evaluating given constraints. Input valida-
tion checks the syntax and partly semantics of informa-
tion provided by user via GUI [17]. Because input 
validation errors may lead to malfunctions of the entire 
system as well as to vulnerabilities for attacks [18], 
various specification-based and implementation-based 
test techniques exist to validate user interfaces [16]. 
Event sequence graphs [3] can be used for analysis and 
validation of UI requirements prior to implementation 
and testing of the code [19].  
Static analysis techniques are used to handle buffer 
overflow problems, which are one of the common secu-
rity issues as they may lead to vulnerabilities like sys-
tem crash, corruption of data or undesirable system ac-
cess. They occur when a programmer implements in-
correct bound checks on buffer size or even fails to do 
bounds checking where data is written into a fixed 
length buffer [12]. By definition buffer overflow is 
similar to boundary overflow, which is an input error 
and occurs when values are entered that violate the 
range of values. Such entries exceed the implicitly or 
explicitly specified but not implemented boundary val-
ues. Therefore, research results on buffer overflows can 
be applied to boundary overflow problems. 
According to [6], static analysis tool BOON applies 
integer range analysis to determine whether a C pro-
gram can index an array outside its bounds. UNO, an-
other static analysis tool accepts user-defined proper-
ties of application specific requirements to overcome 
specific problems [7]. In [8], taint propagation is de-
fined as a technique which is used by static analysis 
tools to find software vulnerabilities caused by failed or 
missing input validation. In taint propagation, the tool 
tracks the tainted data, including also the parts of the 
program where the tainted data has effect on. A taint 
analysis is performed to find the places where data is 
read from an untrusted source [9], e.g., by using Patter-
son’s value range propagation algorithm for calculating 
the range of possible values for each variable [10]. 
However, all of these techniques lack clearly ar-
ranged representations enabling a systematic evalua-
tion. Therefore, we suggest modeling with ESG that are 
augmented with decision tables and DbC patterns to 
provide a simple, nevertheless powerful representation 
of contracts for checking a SUC on numerical input 
vulnerabilities. 
There exist some approaches that adopt the DbC-
idea for testing. Zheng et al. [22] introduced an UML-
based software component testing technique called Test 
by Contract. There are also some contract-based testing 
techniques focused on web service testing [21]. Lan-
guages like Phyton, C++, Java are extended to comply 
with DbC for catching bugs [23]. In [24], the DbC con-
cept is integrated into the programming language Py-
thon and adopted by adding mechanisms for dynamic 
type checking of method parameters and instance vari-
ables. Guerreiro [23] used design by contract in C++ 
by using and inheriting the Assertions class. 
 
3. Theoretical Background 
 
While testing a system, a model of the system helps 
to predict and control its behavior. Modeling a system 
acquires the understanding of its abstraction, and in the 
case of testing GUIs, there is the need of a formal 
specification tool distinguishing between legal and ille-
gal situations. These requirements are fulfilled by 
ESGs. 
 
3.1. Event Sequence Graphs 
 
Apart from the notion of Finite State Automata 
(FSA), in ESG, the simplification by merging the in-
puts and states helps the test engineer to easily under-
stand and check the external behavior of the system, 
hence the “inputs” and “states” are turned into 
“events”. 
Definition 1. An event sequence graph ESG = (V, 
E, ?, ?) is a directed graph where V ≠ ∅ is a finite set 
of vertices (nodes), E ? V?V is a finite set of arcs 
(edges), ?,? ? V are finite sets of distinguished verti-
ces with ???, and γ ? Γ, called entry nodes and exit 
nodes, respectively, wherein ?v ? V there is at least 
one sequence of vertices ?ξ,v0,…,vk? from each ξ ? Ξ to 
vk = v and one sequence of vertices ?v0,…,vk,γ? from v0 
= v to each γ ? Γ with (vi,vi+1) ? E, for i = 0,…,k-1 and 
v ≠ξ,γ. 
Ξ (ESG), Γ (ESG) represent the entry nodes and exit 
nodes of a given ESG, respectively. To mark the entry 
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and exit of an ESG, all ξ ? Ξ are preceded by a pseudo 
vertex ‘[’ ? V and all γ ? Γ are followed by another 
pseudo vertex ‘]’ ? V. The semantics of an ESG is as 
follows: Any v ? V represents an event. For two events 
v, v’ ? V, the event v’ must be enabled after the execu-
tion of v iff (v, v’) ? E. The operations on identifiable 
components of the GUI are controlled and/or perceived 
by input/output devices, i.e., elements of windows, 
buttons, lists, checkboxes, etc. Thus, an event can be a 
user input or a system response; both of them are ele-
ments of V and lead interactively to a succession of 
user inputs and expected desirable system outputs. 
Definition 2. Let V, E be defined as in Definition 1. 
Then any sequence of vertices  ?v0,…,vk? is called an 
event sequence (ES) iff (vi,vi+1) ? E, for i=0,…,k-1. 
Moreover, an ES is complete (or, it is called a complete 
event sequence, CES), iff v0 ? Ξ and vk ? Γ. 
Note that the pseudo vertices ‘[’, ‘]’ are not included 
in ESs. An ES =  ?vi,vk? of length 2 is called an event 
pair (EP). A CES may invoke no interim system re-
sponses during user-system interaction, i.e., it may con-
sist of consecutive user inputs and a final system re-
sponse. 
Our approach assumes that upon a faulty user input 
the system has to inform the user, and, wherever possi-
ble, point him or her properly in the right direction in 
order to reach the desirable final or interim situation. 
Due to this requirement, a complementary view is nec-
essary to consider potential user errors in the modeling 
of the system. Graphically speaking, missing edges of 
the ESG represent undesirable user-system interactions, 
i.e., faulty event pairs (FEP). FEPs can systematically 
be constructed by either (1) adding arcs in the opposite 
direction wherever only one-way arcs exist, or (2) 
adding two-way arcs between vertices wherever no arcs 
connect them, or finally, (3) adding self-loops to verti-
ces wherever none exist.  
Definition 3. Let ES = ?v0,…,vk? be an event se-
quence of length k+1 of an ESG and FEP = ?vk,vm? a 
faulty event pair. The concatenation of the ES and FEP 
then forms a faulty event sequence FES = ?v0,…,vk,vm?. 
FES is complete (or, it is called a faulty complete event 
sequence, FCES) iff v0 ? Ξ. The ES as part of a FCES 
is called a starter. 
CES and FCES form test cases to our SUC. The 
SUC is supposed to accept test inputs described by 
CESs in the specified order whereas test inputs de-
scribed by FCESs should result in a warning. 
 
3.2. Decision Table Augmented ESGs 
 
Modeling input data, especially concerning causal 
dependencies between each other as additional nodes, 
inflates the ESG model. To avoid this, decision tables 
are introduced to refine a node of the ESG, (e.g. see 
Table 2). Such refined nodes are double-circled. 
Definition 4: A Decision Table DT = {C,A,R} 
represents actions that depend on certain constraints 
where: 
? C ≠ ∅  is the set of constraints 
? A ≠ ∅  is the set of actions 
? R ≠ ∅  is the set of rules that describe execu-
table actions depending on a certain combina-
tion of constraints 
Decision tables [11] are popular in information 
processing and are also used for testing, e.g., in cause 
and effect graphs. A decision table logically links con-
ditions (”if”) with actions (”then”) that are to be trig-
gered, depending on combinations of conditions 
(”rules”) [4]. 
Definition 5: Let R be defined as in Definition 4. 
Then a rule Ri ? R is defined as Ri = (CTrue,CFalse,Ax) 
where: 
? CTrue ? C is the set of constraints that have to 
be resolved to true 
? CFalse = C\CTrue is the set of constraints that 
have to be resolved to false 
? Ax ? A is the set of actions that should be ex-
ecutable if all constraints t ? CTrue are re-
solved to true and all constraints f ? CFalse are 
resolved to false 
Note that CTrue ?  CFalse = C and CTrue ∩ CFalse = ∅ 
under regular circumstances. In certain cases it is in-
evitable to remark conditions with a don't care (sym-
bolized with a '-' in DT), i.e., such a condition is not 
considered in a rule and CTrue ? CFalse?? C. We use DT 
to refine data input of GUI’s. 
 
3.3. DbC Patterns for Decision Tables 
 
DbC is an object-oriented design technique that was 
first introduced by Meyer in 1992 [20]. DbC focuses 
on the extension of source code, e.g., a method, by pre-
conditions, post-conditions, and invariants that can be 
evaluated during runtime (similar to a legal contract). 
Pre-conditions have to be fulfilled before a method is 
executed; post-conditions have to be ensured after a 
method is executed. Invariants are conditions that must 
hold anytime a method is invoked [21]. Software com-
ponents are extended by those pre-conditions, post-
conditions, and invariants so that the compliance with 
them can be verified during runtime. Although decision 
tables can contain a wide variety of constraints, we 
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classified them into three groups; namely pre-condi-
tions, post-conditions, and invariants, by utilizing DbC 
patterns for automation purposes. The automation to be 
achieved comes in two folds: (1) test automation to 
detect error(s) and (2) automatic code correction to re-
move defects from software. 
Now, for consider DbC concepts and moreover ex-
ception messages to be thrown, we refine the definition 
of rules in Definition 6. 
Definition 6: Let CTrue and CFalse be defined as in 
definition 5 and A be defined as A = Axcpt ? Aui with 
Axcpt containing exception messages and Aui containing 
possible user interactions. Then a rule can be defined 
by  
Ri = (t,CTrue,CFalse,Ax) where 
? t ? {t<, t>, t<>} is a time marker with  
o t< indicating pre-condition 
o t> indicating post-condition 
o t<> indicating invariant 
? Ax ? Acorr with Acorr ? Aui ? {Axcpt ? ?} and ? 
defining an empty exception 
Example. For DT presented in Table 1, following 
sets and rules are given: 
Aui = {accept, abort, btn_3} 
Axcpt = {Exception1, Exception2, Exception 3}  
R1 = ({t<}, {Condition1, Condition2}, {}, {(accept, 
?), (abort, ?), (btn_3, ?)}) 
R2 = ({t<}, {Condition1}, {Condition2}, {(accept, 
Exception1), (abort, ?), (btn_3, Exception3)}) 
R3 = ({t<}, {Condition2}, {Condition1}, {(accept, 
Exception2), (abort, ?), (btn_3, ?)}) 
R4 = ({t<}, {}, {Condition1, Condition2}, {(accept, 
Exception1), (accept, Exception2), (abort, ?), (btn_3, 
Exception3)}) 
 
Table 1. Example of a refined DT with 
exceptions 
t< R1 R2 R3 R4 
Condition1 T T F F 
Condition2 T F T F 
accept X    
 Exception1  X  X 
Exception2   X X 
abort X X X X 
btn_3 X  X  
 Exception3  X  X 
As an example, rule 3 reads as follows: If 
Condition2 is resolved to true and Condition1 is 
resolved to false, a press of accept button results in 
Exception1, a press of abort or btn_3 will throw no 
exception and therefore the input is accepted. 
We use pre-conditions, post-conditions, and invari-
ants to supplement DTs with specific classes  of rules. 
 
3.4. Test Case Generation Algorithm 
 
Nodes of an ESG represent either events or other 
ESGs or decision tables. An ESG visualizes sequences 
of events and therefore allows detection of 
discrepancies in the sequential execution of user-
system-interaction [4]. DTs augment the ESG given to 
support analysis of causal dependencies and restrictions 
of events. Especially, pre-condition pattern of DbC 
could be used to avoid vulnerabilities introduced by 
invalid inputs. Pre-conditions will ensure that the 
inputs taken from GUI are valid. For input validation, 
only pre-condition rules are entered into the DT. 
Hence, decision table augmented ESGs are reduced 
and simplified by considering only the pre-conditions 
of the GUI inputs. 
Equivalence class testing partitions the input space 
into equivalence classes according to the input condi-
tions. Test cases are designed by selecting at least one 
condition from each equivalence class. Our approach 
supplements this technique with boundary value analy-
sis [1,2] which complements the equivalence partition-
ing by selecting test cases at the edges of a class [2]. 
Thus, we strengthen equivalence class testing by the 
cause-effect testing approach which uses decision ta-
bles to generate test cases where the input conditions 
represent the causes and actions represent the effects. 
This leads to an algorithm to generate test case values 
from DbC-supplemented decision tables by considering 
three validation types: isolated validation, interdepen-
dency validation, and service-specific validation [25], 
as depicted in Figure 1.  
Isolated validation checks boundary conditions 
(restrictions) and interdependency validation checks 
relations between the variables (dependencies). 
Service-specific validation considers conditions related 
to business or service. As an example, consider port 
values: For isolated validation, the considered variables 
should be between the port ranges (0-65535). The 
restriction that the minimum port value should be lower 
than the maximum port value is associated with 
interdependency validation. The dynamic and/or 
private ports are from 49152 through 65535 [5]. No 
ports can be registered in the dynamic range and it is 
commonly used by operating system kernels. The port 
allocations are only valid for the duration of the session 
of the connection. For service-specific validation, the 
port values between the dynamic ranges are not valid 
when the session is closed, although the values are 
inside the port ranges and the dependency requirement 
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Input: Decision Table 
Output: Test Cases 
for each rule 
generate a test case by considering each variable in isolation 
modify the test case by considering the interdependencies between the variables 
modify the test case by considering the service-specific conditions 
end for 
holds for the port values. Hence, input validation 
aspect supports all three types. 
 
arg1 arg2 arg3
Isolated Validation
arg1 arg2 arg3
Interdependency Validation
arg1 arg2 arg3
Service-specific Validation
Business Service Rules  
Figure 1. Input validation types [25] 
 
Algorithm 1 shows the test case generation 
algorithm. For all the rules in the decision table, a 
specific test value for each variable is generated by 
regarding all its conditions and test values for all 
variables constitute the test case for that rule. First four 
columns in the decision table are for holding the type 
of the validation, variable1, operator and boundary, 
which can be a value or a variable depending on the 
type of the validation, respectively. 
The decision table that is used to generate the test 
cases using the algorithm in Section 6 (Case Study) is 
shown in Table 2 and the test cases generated are 
depicted in Table 3. The algorithm creates a list for 
each constraint containing the conditions of the 
variables and generates the test values according to the 
following policy: First, test values are generated 
according to the boundary conditions for each variable 
in isolation. The generated values are alternating 
around the boundary values. Second, the relationships 
and dependencies for the variables are considered and 
the test values are altered according to the relation if 
needed. Finally, the test values are modified by 
considering the service-specific conditions. 
 
4. Numerical Input Validation  
 
The numerical input validation approach proposed 
here is composed of two phases: (1) testing the SUC 
with the test cases generated by DbC Supplemented 
ESGs and (2) detecting/correcting deficient input 
validation code if errors are found during the test 
phase. 
 
4.1. Testing by DbC Supplemented ESGs 
 
As a first step, the approach generates test cases by 
using decision table augmented-ESGs as defined in 
Section 3. Equivalence class testing supplemented with 
boundary value analysis is used to generate test cases, 
which are selected from the values that are at the edges 
of each equivalence class. Equivalence class testing is 
strengthened by the cause-effect testing approach 
which uses decision tables to design test cases. 
As a second step, the SUC is tested manually in real 
environment by entering these values to its user 
interface. The faults are obtained and extracted 
manually to a file. Applying our proposed detection 
and correction method (see next section), the new 
corrected version of the SUC is tested in the real 
environment again. The faults before and after applying 
our method are compared. The approach is summarized 
in Figure 2. 
 
4.2. Deficient Input Validation Code 
Detection and Correction 
 
We propose a detection algorithm to check the error 
handling mechanism of the SUC related to validation 
of numerical inputs. The algorithm scans the source 
code statically, detects the points that may cause prob-
lems (possible violation of boundaries) and checks the 
error handling mechanism of the SUC against 
validation errors. The deficient parts of the error 
handling mechanism related to numerical input 
validation are identified first. Once detected, a 
mechanism is required to correct the deficiencies. The 
correction mechanism relies upon the DbC technique 
discussed in Section 3. Our correction algorithm 
provides an error handling mechanism through 
extension of source code by pre-condition contract 
methods where control for the numerical input 
validation vulnerability does not exist.  
 
Algorithm 1. Test case generation algorithm 
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Figure 2. Summary of the approach 
 
Deficient numerical input validation code detection 
algorithm consists of four steps. In step 1, pre-
conditions, which are defined in the decision table that 
is generated by the decision table augmented ESG 
method, are uploaded from related directory. In step 2, 
the variable definitions along with their specified types 
are found from the source code and displayed in a 
table. In step 3, the variables shown in the table are 
matched with the uploaded pre-conditions. Matched 
variable’s boundary condition is set to true. Step 4 
traces the variables from the source code and finds the 
first line that the variable is used. After that, the pre-
conditions are compared with the conditions of the 
variable, written in the source code.  
After detection algorithm is completed correction 
algorithm, which is considered as step 5, may be 
executed. The correction mechanism extends the 
source code by inserting “Require” function (the 
function for implementing pre-conditions in DbC) as in 
[23]. As mentioned in the previous subsection, three 
types of pre-conditions are checked. The mechanism is 
applied after the trace line of the variable where the 
condition check for the variable does not exist.  
 
5. Implementation and Tool support 
 
For the implementation of our approach as 
introduced in Section 4, we developed a numerical 
input validation analysis tool in Java in  Microsoft 
Windows environment, working on software developed 
in C++. As a static analysis tool, it analyzes the source 
code of SUC, finds the deficient parts that may cause 
numerical input validation vulnerabilities and extends 
the source code by inserting pre-condition functions to 
ensure that the specified conditions hold before the 
inputs are processed. The class “Assertions” [23] that 
provides the functions required for emulating pre-
conditions and post-conditions is used for exception 
handling, where in our case, only the pre-conditions are 
considered. Its ”Require” function is used by our tool 
to be inserted where the deficiency of a control 
mechanism exists for numerical input validation.  
The numerical input validation analysis tool takes 
two inputs: (1) the directory of the software to be 
analyzed and (2) DbC supplemented DT for the GUI. 
Our implementation requires a manual matching of the 
listed variables with the pre-conditions from DT 
augmented ESG model of the GUI. The tool outputs 
the variables that have the boundary condition, displays 
the conditions of the variables as well as whether or not 
condition checks exist in the source code related to 
numerical input validation. The correction mechanism 
is applied by informing the user about the insertion of 
the exception handling code where the pre-condition 
checks do not exist. Figure 3 shows GUI of the tool 
that enables to input source directory of the software to 
be checked, shows the detection steps, suggests 
corrections and displays the outputs. 
 
6. Case Study 
 
We evaluated our approach and the tool introduced 
in Section 5 by means of three port scanners. A port 
scan function analyzes a single port or a range of ports, 
i.e., ports between a given minimum and maximum, to 
check whether they are open or not. The user interface 
behavior of the port scan function is modeled by using 
DT augmented ESG. Test cases are generated for 
minimum and maximum port from the decision table 
using test case generation algorithm presented in 
Section 3. Test of the port scan function is evaluated in 
a real network environment and faults have been 
recorded. As a next step, our tool analyzes the source 
directory to detect and correct the vulnerabilities 
related to boundary overflow. Finally, the faults 
detected before and after applying the boundary 
overflow detection algorithm are compared. 
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Figure 3. Numerical input validation analysis tool - graphical user interface screen 
 
6.1. Boundary Overflow Detection 
 
We exemplify the case study on the basis of the port 
scanner part of open source firewall software, i.e., 
Netdefender Firewall (version 1.5) [13]. Its GUI is 
shown in Figure 4. The ESG model of the port scanner 
is given in Figure 5. The decision table given by Table 
2 refines the related nodes of the ESG, which are 
double-circled [4], e.g., the node labeled “enter 
min&max ports” of Figure 5 is refined by Table 2. 
Table 2 structures the decision process by modeling 
possible actions for related conditions. The decision 
table is built to generate test data for the minimum and 
maximum port values of the port scanner according to 
the rules. Algorithm 1 is applied to generate test data 
according to the rules of the decision table. For each 
rule, a test pair is generated based on equivalence class 
testing and boundary value approach. The constraints 
in the first part (rows 1-4) of the decision table indicate 
the boundary conditions. Meanwhile, the constraints in 
the rows 5-7 indicate the relations of the variables with 
each other. Furthermore, the constraints in the rows 8-9 
are included due to service-specific constraints. 
 
 
Figure 4. Netdefender Port Scanner 
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The algorithm creates a list for each constraint 
containing the conditions of the variables and generates 
the min and max test case pairs. Table 3 shows the 
generated test values as the output of the test data 
generation algorithm. 
 
6.2. Testing Process in Real Environment 
 
The port scanner is evaluated in a local area network 
(LAN) and the generated test values are applied as in-
puts to the GUI of the port scanner. The user interface 
outputs are obtained and the network packet outputs 
are captured. The outputs are extracted to a spreadsheet 
document. Table 4 shows a sample view of the spread-
sheet document. The document displays the test values 
as input pair, GUI and network packet outputs, state of 
the case (erroneous or not), and the error message. 
 
 
Figure 5. ESG model of the port scanner 
showing legal and illegal interaction pairs 
 
Table 2. Decision Table for “Enter min&max ports” of Figure 5 
 Conditions R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 R17 R18 R19 R20 R21 R22 R23 R24 
1 min >= 0 F F F F F F T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
2 min <= 65535 T T T T T T F F F F F F T T T T T T T T T T T T 
3 max >= 0 F F F T T T F T T T T T F F T T T T T T T T T T 
4 max <= 65535 T T T F T T T F F F T T T T F F T T T T T T T T 
5 min < max F F T T T T T F F T F F F F T T F F F F F T T T 
6 min = max F T F F F F F F T F F F F F F F F F F T T F F F 
7 min > max T F F F F F F T F F T T T T F F T T T F F F F F 
8 min < 49152 T T T T T T F F F F F F F T F T F F T F T F T T 
9 max < 49152 T T T F F T T F F F F T T T F F F T T F T F F T 
Actions 
A1 Exception 1 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X         
A2 Exception 2 X X      X X  X X X X   X X X X X    
A3 Exception 3    X X  X X X X X X X  X X X X  X  X X  
A4 Accept input                        X 
 
To sum up, the cases with out of boundary input 
pairs give rise to problems in the network environment. 
In certain cases (2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16), there are 
faulty input pairs that are out of boundary values but 
the program behaves as they are not faulty. This is 
critical, because the program does not abandon proc-
essing the related task, hence the resulting situation 
forces the program to work erroneously. In some cases 
(2, 3, 7, 13, 14), the client does not stop sending the 
TCP packets to the target computer, keeps on sending 
the packets in an infinite loop and generates a flood in 
LAN. 
 
6.3. Evaluation and Lessons Learned 
 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 presented the test results of the 
first SUC. Table 5 displays the outputs after the 
evaluation of our tool on the port scanner of the Netde-
fender firewall. It can be seen that the original software 
does not have control mechanisms for the out of 
boundary input values causing boundary overflow.  
 
Table 3. Test Cases generated from rules of 
the Decision Table 
Rule Test Values Rule Test Values 
R1 (-1,-2) R13 (49152,-1) 
R2 (-1,-1) R14 (0,-1) 
R3 (-2,-1) R15 (49152,65536) 
R4 (-1,65536) R16 (0,65536) 
R5 (-1,49152) R17 (49153,49152) 
R6 (-1,0) R18 (49152,0) 
R7 (65536,-1) R19 (1,0) 
R8 (65537,65536) R20 (49152,49152) 
R9 (65536,65536) R21 (0,0) 
R10 (65536,65537) R22 (49152,49153) 
R11 (65536,49152) R23 (0,49152) 
R12 (65536,0) R24 (0,1) 
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Table 4. Outputs of the test cases 
# Input Pair GUI Output Network Packet Erroneous? Error Message? 
1 (-1,-2) 
 
No output No packet Yes Message 1 
2 (-1,-1) (-1,0,1,2,3,...∞) 65535,1,2,...65535… Yes No 
3 (-2,-1) (-2,-1,0,1,2,3,...∞) 65534,65535,1,2,...65535… Yes No 
4 (-1,65536) No output No packet Yes Message 1 
5 (-1,49152) No output No packet Yes Message 1 
6 (-1,0) No output No packet Yes Message 1 
7 (65536,-1) (65536...∞) 1,2,...65535,1,2,....65535… Yes No 
8 (65537,65536) No output No packet Yes Message 1 
9 (65536,65536) (65536) No packet Yes No 
10 (65536,65537) (65536,65537) 1 Yes No 
11 (65536,49152) No output No packet Yes Message 1 
12 (65536,0) No output No packet Yes Message 1 
13 (49152,-1) (49152...∞) 49152,49153,...65535,1,2,...65535… Yes No 
14 (0,-1) (0...∞) 1,2,...65535,1,2,...65535… Yes No 
15 (49152,65536) (49152...65536) 49152,49153,…65535 Yes No 
16 (0,65536) (0...65536) 1,2,…65535 Yes No 
17 (49153,49152) No output No packet Yes Message 1 
18 (49152,0) No output No packet Yes Message 1 
19 (1,0) No output No packet Yes Message 1 
20 (49152,49152) (49152) 49152 No  
21 (0,0) (0) No packet No  
22 (49152,49153) (49152,49153) 49152,49153 No  
23 (0,49152) (0,49152) 1,2,…49152 No  
24 (0,1) (0,1) 1 No  
Message 1: “The maximum range cannot be less than the minimum one”. 
 
The second and third evaluations were performed on 
port scanners named Multiscan (version 0.8.5) [14] and 
Pscan [15]. They are open source port scanners coded 
in C++, which allow you to scan a range of IP ad-
dresses and ports. 
As in the first evaluation, we observed that also the 
second and third SUC have no exception handling 
mechanisms. The control mechanisms against out of 
boundary values are deficient for the three port scan-
ners. Hence in all of three cases, our tool inserted con-
trol statements to fulfill the deficiencies of the soft-
ware. After the insertion of control statements related 
to boundary constraints in the port scanner of Netde-
fender firewall, the software is evaluated in LAN again 
and the generated test cases are applied as inputs to the 
GUI of the port scanner. The outputs considerably dif-
fer from the ones in Table 4. In erroneous cases (1-19), 
the software outputs the right error message and aborts 
sending the packets. 
An overview of the three test runs comparing num-
ber of faults detected before and after the detection al-
gorithm can be seen in Table 5. It is evident that our 
tool has successfully carried out detection and correc-
tion operations. Analysis of the evaluation results en-
courages the generalization that boundary overflow 
vulnerabilities are not considered and thus counter-
measure actions are neglected during software devel-
opment. Therefore, tools as we introduced in this paper 
might be useful to prevent likely failures or undesirable 
situations that may occur as a consequence of defi-
ciency control mechanism in the software. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of the three test runs 
  # of faults 
detected 
 
Software # of 
test 
cases 
Before After Benefit of the approach 
(% of faults corrected) 
Netdefender 24 19 0 100% 
Multiscan 24 10 0 100% 
Pscan 24 4 0 100% 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a solution for the 
numerical input validation problem and reported our 
experience gained through experiments as described in 
case study. DT augmented ESGs supplemented with 
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DbC patterns are used for modeling GUI of SUC and 
generating test cases for input validation. An algorithm 
is introduced to validate the exception handling 
mechanism of SUC related to invalid numerical inputs 
and provide the necessary exception handling mecha-
nism where none exists. A tool we developed supports 
the deployment of the algorithm introduced. Three port 
scanners have been tested for evaluation of this tool. 
Results of those tests show that the approach is very ef-
fective for finding deficiencies in the exception han-
dling mechanism of SUC concerning boundary over-
flow problems. Moreover, our approach includes ap-
propriate checks to compensate those deficiencies of 
SUC. 
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